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House Rules: Why Implementing Express
Rules Governing Conflicts of Laws Absent
Parties Explicit Choice will Strengthen
International Arbitration Tribunals
S AIKRISHNA SRIKANTH * ©
INTRODUCTION

In 1865, England became the first nation to accept private parties’ right to decide
the proper law of their contract, thereby greenlighting party autonomy as a
foundational principle in choice of law jurisprudence. 1 As choice of law
jurisprudence evolved from litigating issues in courts to parties utilizing their
autonomy to have an arbitration house manage their agreement, commercial
arbitration has boomed.2 By choosing arbitration, parties are free to select various
procedural and substantive rules that they believe will best regulate any dispute
that may arise from their agreement. 3 Furthermore, private parties retain the

*J.D., University of Maryland, 2019. The author wishes to thank Professor William J. Moon for his invaluable
guidance and comments; Professor Richard Boldt for his conversations and his wisdom; and Dean Renee
Hutchins for her sage advice to look beyond one’s comfort zone. The author extends gratitude to the Hon. Mark
S. Ali, J.S.C., for his constant positivity and mentorship. The author wishes to thank Kevin Redden and the
Maryland Journal of Business and Technology Law editors for their tireless efforts. The author also wishes to
thank Dr. Anuradha Mudipalli and Dr. Srikanth Nadadur, his parents, whose encouragement is only surpassed
by their affection. Finally, this paper is dedicated to the author’s wife, Deepya Sai Nallamshetty, whose
unwavering confidence and unmatched love motivated the author to see this paper through to publication.
1. See Karen Denise Untiedt, International Contracts under the Conflict of Laws Rules of Great Britain and
Japan, 7 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 193, 198 (1984) (explaining that England was the first country to allow parties
to choose the governing law of their contract and thereby recognizing party autonomy); see also Ole Lando,
The Substantive Rules in the Conflict of Laws: Comparative Comments from the Law of Contracts, 11 TEX. INT’L L.
J. 505, 523 (1976) (“The distinction between private law and public law rules has been a basic one in civil law
where many authors and courts still maintain that the normal conflict of law rules only refer to substantive
rules of private law.”).
2. See Stavros Brekoulakis, International Arbitration Scholarship and the Concept of Arbitration Law, 36
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 745, 766 (2013) (“In the area of commercial arbitration, for example, it is now accepted that
tribunals have authority to determine not only commercial claims pertaining to the formation, interpretation,
and performance of a commercial contract, but also statutory claims that may have crucial social implications
or involve public policy.”).
3. See Soia Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 849 (1961) (“The simplest
[setting for arbitration] is when two persons in a contract delineating a business relationship agree to settle any
disputes that may arise under the contract by resort to arbitration before named arbitrators or persons to be
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freedom to determine the location of their arbitration, irrespective of whether the
parties themselves are physically present in these settings. 4 Such flexibility in rules
bolstered parties’ desire for arbitration and emboldened the formation of
arbitration houses in major commercial centers across the globe. 5
The establishment and subsequent growth of major international arbitration
houses is directly tied to the rules that govern each house.6 Since different houses
offer different rules, parties are free to decide which house’s rules are best suited
to govern the parties’ transaction.7 When the parties clearly define, and agree to,
the law applicable to the merits of their arrangement, arbitrators will still “have to
address [issues] that cannot be dealt with by simply applying the law chosen.” 8
Additionally, when the parties do not make an explicit choice on the applicable
rules, a house’s rules will typically provide some, but not complete, clarity in guiding
arbitrators to reach the correct decision for each proceeding. 9 Given that each
arbitral tribunal has its own rules, the resolution of a conflict of laws dispute, absent
parties’ choice under one house, can differ from the determination of another
house.
This article proposes one solution to resolve the different results that emerge
when parties do not make their choice of law explicit: arbitration houses should
have express rules governing conflicts of laws. Since arbitration houses compete
with each other to attract business, a single house adopting express rules to govern
choice of law in the absence of the parties’ explicit choice could change the
landscape of arbitration selection. A house that adopts express choice of law rules
absent the parties’ clear instruction could draw more business than its competitors
because it provides a crystallized standard for addressing conflicts. Moreover,
named at the time of the dispute. In this, which can be called individuated arbitration, the making of all
arrangements, including the procedures for arbitration, rests entirely with the parties concerned.”).
4. See Steve Nelson & Michael Robbins, Guide to International Arbitration, DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP 1 (Feb.
2016),
https://www.dorsey.com/-/media/files/asiapacific/dorseyasiaguidetointernationalarbitration.pdf?la=en (“The arbitral process itself is governed by the law
of the place chosen as the situs or seat of arbitration, which need not be the law governing the contract in
dispute, and by arbitral rules chosen by the parties.”).
5. See Eric Bergsten, Americanization of International Arbitration, 18 PACE INT’L L. REV. 289, 292 (2006)
(“International commercial arbitration developed primarily on the continent of Europe, with France, Germany
and Switzerland participating in a significant number of cross-border arbitrations.”).
6. See Nelson & Robbins, supra note 4, at 3 (“For example, a choice of Singapore as the seat would mean
that the Singapore International Arbitration Act 1994 will serve as the applicable procedural law governing the
arbitration, including provision for any limited involvement of the Singapore courts that may become necessary
to ensure effective operation of the arbitral process.”).
7. See id. (“When choosing a seat, the parties must consider what ramifications will follow.”).
8. Linda Silberman & Franco Ferrari, Getting to the Law Applicable to the Merits in International
Arbitration and the Consequences of Getting it Wrong, NYU LAW AND ECONOMICS RESEARCH PAPER No. 10–40 1, 2
(2010).
9. See id. (“When the parties have not chosen the law applicable to the merits, relevant arbitration laws
and/or the arbitral rules will usually provide some direction to the arbitrators.”).
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because international arbitration houses are a-national,10 these houses have
greater flexibility than state or federal governments in crafting these express rules.
Given that arbitration is a chaotic field where results vary based on numerous
factors, ranging from terms of the agreement to selection of a governing house, the
implementation of express rules to govern choice of law absent the parties’
directive would bring further legitimacy to arbitration houses.
To reach this conclusion, this article proceeds in the following manner. Part I
maps the history of international commercial arbitration in the Twentieth Century
and the formation of competing arbitration houses. Specifically, this part looks to
four major houses of arbitration: The International Chamber of Commerce in Paris,
the London Court of International Arbitration, the Singapore International
Arbitration Centre, and the American Arbitration Association. These houses have
been selected because parties have either historically or recently favored these
forums for international commercial arbitration. Part II briefly outlines various rules
of these major arbitration houses that govern choice of law and examines the
language of those houses that offer a rule for parties who do not make their choice
of law explicit. By identifying the conflicts rules of each house, this part illuminates
the gaps that exist when parties do not make their choice of law explicit.
Part III fleshes out the value of having express rules governing conflicts of laws
absent parties’ explicit choice. Sub-part A addresses previous scholarship in this
space. Sub-part B examines the proposal to have arbitration houses adopt these
express rules. First, two cases are scrutinized to demonstrate how arbitration
houses rule when parties do not make their choice of law explicit. Next, the
discussion proceeds to the normative support for adopting express rules absent
parties’ choice, emphasizing that it will (1) increase competition between the
arbitration houses by incentivizing other houses to adopt similar express rules, (2)
establish a novel concept, the default house rule, which does not interfere with
parties’ ability to contract, and (3) ensure that gaps that arise from parties not
expressing a choice of law regarding arbitration will be filled in a way that
strengthens private dispute resolution without undermining public policy.
I.

A HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL C OMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE
F ORMATION OF FOUR MAJOR HOUSES

International commercial arbitration arose in the early Twentieth Century despite
the absence of two nations that play a significant role in shaping global trade: The
United States and England.11 Although England established an international
commercial arbitration house in 1892, the London Court of International Arbitration

10. See Hans Smit, A-National Arbitration, 63 TUL. L. REV. 629 (1989) (“The basic characteristic of a-national
arbitration is that it does not owe its existence, validity, or effectiveness to a particular national law.”).
11. See Bergsten, supra note 5, at 291.
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(“LCIA”)12, English law governed the substantive and procedural aspects of these
international commercial disputes.13 The United States and England’s absence in
the realm of arbitration prompted questions of “whether there was anything that
could be called international commercial arbitration in the post-World War II
period.”14 Nonetheless, a significant number of arbitrations occurred in Europe in
the immediate post-World War II period, with parties often selecting to arbitrate
their disputes at the International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”) in Paris. 15
A. The International Chamber of Commerce
Established in 1919 in Paris, France, the ICC’s founders aimed to “create an
organization that would represent business everywhere.” 16 In 1923, four years after
its inception, the ICC created the International Court of Arbitration and designated
it to serve as the principal forum for arbitrating international commercial disputes. 17
For several years after its establishment, parties that submitted disputes to the ICC
for arbitration limited their claims to matters such as the “supply of industrial plant
and public works, sales contracts, agency distribution contracts, license
agreements, the formation and winding-up of companies, share transactions, and
maritime disputes.”18 These claims made up the bulk of the roughly fifty cases per
year that the ICC arbitrated, a sizeable number for its time. 19 Over time, the ICC
Court of Arbitration’s case load grew exponentially. 20 Today, the ICC Court of
Arbitration manages the largest caseload of any arbitration house in the world that
is involved in international commercial arbitration.21 Moreover, American parties

12.

THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION REVIEW 192 (James H. Carter ed., 4th. ed. 2013).
See Bergsten, supra note 5, at 291 (“Therefore, there was English arbitration of international
commercial disputes, not English participation in international commercial arbitration.”) (emphasis omitted).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 292.
16. See History, INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, https://iccwbo.org/about-us/who-we-are/history/
(last visited Apr. 5, 2019).
17. See id. (explaining the ICC founded the International Court of Arbitration in 1923).
18. Leonard N. Bannicke, International Chamber of Commerce Court of Arbitration, 23 ALTA L. REV. 51, 51
(1985).
19. Bergsten, supra note 5, at 292.
20. L. CRAIG, INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION (Oceana Publications & ICC Publishing 1990)
(explaining that by 1990, the International Court of Arbitration “received 300 new requests per year, with a
total of some 7,000 cases in its 67 years of existence.”); see also Dawn Chardonnal, ICC Announces 2017 Figures
Confirming Global Reach and Leading Position for Complex, High-Value Disputes, INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE (last visited Apr. 5, 2019) https://iccwbo.org/media-wall/news-speeches/icc-announces-2017figures-confirming-global-reach-leading-position-complex-high-value-disputes/ (stating that “[a]ccording to
the latest figures, a total of 810 new cases were filed in 2017” and “[t]he Court has administered 23,000 cases
since its creation in 1923.”).
21. See Chardonnal, supra note 20; see also Craig, supra note 20, at 374.
13.
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are increasingly seeking out the ICC to handle their disputes through international
commercial arbitration.22
B.

The London Court of International Arbitration

While the ICC continued to prosper in the post-World War II era, it took time for
America and England to warm to international commercial arbitration. As
mentioned in Part A, the LCIA formed in 1892. However, English attitudes towards
international commercial arbitration remained sour, largely because “arbitral
proceedings were perceived essentially as ancillary fact-finding procedures.”23
Moreover, the English believed that “arbitrators merely attempted to ‘play judge’
and could not render cogent adjudicatory determinations.” 24 Nevertheless, as
England grew to dominate world trade during the nineteenth century and
international commercial parties increasingly looked to the London Court of
International Arbitration to settle their disputes, Parliament passed the Arbitration
Act of 1950 to govern international commercial arbitration.25 Parliament then
revised the Arbitration Act in 197926 to enable “exclusion agreements”27 that, in
effect, provide for arguably the greatest party autonomy amongst the international
arbitration houses.28 As a result of this change, the LCIA is “no longer considered an
exclusively English organization,”29 and remains one of the world’s leading
international institutions for international commercial arbitrations.
22. See Bergsten, supra note 5, at 300 (noting that as of 2005, “about one-fourth of the cases heard before
the ICC involve an American party.”).
23. Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Reception of Arbitration in United States Law, 40 ME. L. REV. 263, 267
(1988).
24. Id.
25. See Richard J. Graving, The International Commercial Arbitration Institutions: How Good A Job Are They
Doing?, 4 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 319, 342–43 (1989); see also Arbitration Act 1950, 14 Geo. 6 c. 27, §§ 31-43
(Eng.), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1950/27/pdfs/ukpga_19500027_en.pdf (last visited Feb. 21,
2020) (providing the governing rules for international commercial arbitration).
26. Arbitration
Act
1979
(Commencement)
Order
1979,
c.
16
(Eng.),
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/1979/750/pdfs/uksi_19790750_en.pdf.
27. Graving, supra note 25, at 346 (exclusion agreements mean that “now parties to international contracts
may, unless they are all “domestic,” adopt a clause to contract out of any appeal at any time, before or after a
dispute
arises.”);
see
also
Arbitration
Act
1979,
Eliz.
c.42,
§
3(1)
(Eng.),
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1979/42/pdfs/ukpga_19790042_en.pdf
(detailing the statutory
requirements for exclusion agreements).
28. Graving, supra note 25, at 346; see also Michael Kerr, The Arbitration Act 1979, 43 MOD. L. REV., 45
(1980) (“[t]he Act permits the parties to contract out of any appeal by means of “exclusion agreements,” with
the result that arbitral tribunals are then wholly unfettered in their decisions except in relation to allegations
of “misconduct,” which remain unaffected by the Act.”).
29. See Winston Stromberg, Avoiding the Full Court Press: International Commercial Arbitration and Other
Global Alternative Dispute Resolution Processes, 40 LOY. L. A. L. REV. 1337, 1355 (2007) (explaining that by 2007,
“more than 70 percent of the cases filed with the LCIA involve non-U.K. parties.”); see also Facts and Figures –
2017 Casework Report, LONDON CT. OF INT’L ARB. 1, 3 (last visited Apr. 8, 2019),
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C.

The American Arbitration Association

Similar to England, the United States resisted adopting international commercial
arbitration as a viable alternative to litigation. 30 Although the United States created
its flagship arbitration house in 1926, 31 the American Arbitration Association
(“AAA”), the United States did not fully embrace arbitration until 1970, 32 when the
United States ratified the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards (“New York Convention”).33 Before ratifying the New York
Convention, America disfavored arbitration, treating the practice as trespassing on
the realm of the courts.34 America only began to trek towards embracing
international commercial arbitration when approached by international petroleum
companies seeking to resolve their complex concession clause issues with recently
decolonized nations.35 American law firms, while not well-versed in arbitration, had
sizable rosters of attorneys, many of whom navigated similar issues to the ones
facing these oil companies.36 In assisting these companies, the reality of the
burgeoning international commercial trade scene and a desire to arbitrate instead
of litigate became too overwhelming to ignore.
By 1970, when the United States ratified the New York Convention, a key fixture
in international arbitration that “applies to the recognition and enforcement of

file:///Users/kellycallahan/Downloads/LCIA%20Facts%20and%20Figures%20%202017%20Casework%20Report.pdf (As of 2017, “The vast majority of parties (over 80%) came from outside
the United Kingdom, with an increasingly significant number from the United States.”).
30. Bergsten, supra note 5, at 293 (This resistance is explained, at least in part, because “international
commercial arbitration developed essentially as an adaptation of the civil law rules of procedure, and not those
of the common law known in the United States and England.”).
31. The American Arbitration Association: A Long History of Working with Government, AM. ARB. ASS’N,
https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/document_repository/AAA%20Government%20Services.pdf
(last
visited Feb. 21, 2020).
32. Carbonneau, supra note 23, at 263.
33. See
Status
of
Treaties,
UNITED
NATIONS
TREATY
COLLECTION,
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXII-1&chapter=22&clang=_en (last
visited Mar. 06, 2020) (showing what countries have ratified the Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, including the United States); see also United Nations Convention on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York, 10 June 1958), NEW YORK ARBITRATION
CONVENTION, http://www.newyorkconvention.org/english (last visited Mar. 06, 2020) (specifically listing the
articles of the Convention ratifying the arbitral awards); see also Carbonneau, supra note 23, at 272 (“The New
York Convention … is the universal charter of international commercial arbitration. Its ratification is a measure
of a nation’s acceptance of international commercial arbitration.”).
34. Carbonneau, supra note 23, at 266; see also Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: The New Litigation,
2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 8 (2010) (“Arbitration was popularly touted as a more efficient, less costly, and more final
method for resolving disputes; there was little or no discovery, motion practice, judicial review, or other
trappings of litigation.”).
35. Bergsten, supra note 5, at 293.
36. Id. at 294.
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foreign arbitral awards and the referral by a court to arbitration,” 37 America had
become more accepting of international commercial arbitration. 38 After ratifying
the New York Convention, the AAA shrewdly alerted parties that they could now
include arbitration clauses in their international contracts and ensure that the
arbitral awards would not be upended by an American court.39 The AAA’s
suggestion paid off because within twenty years, the United States Supreme Court
adopted a policy “favoring international trade and commerce,” and subsequently
steered lower federal courts “toward an unequivocal endorsement of arbitration
for the resolution of private international commercial disputes.” 40
In 1996, the AAA established the International Centre for Dispute Resolution
(“ICDR”) to strengthen its international presence in commercial arbitration.41 While
concern existed for the AAA’s ability to attract completely international parties to
the ICDR in its first ten years,42 there has been an uptick in international parties
filing cases with the ICDR in the last few years. 43 American commercial parties
currently believe that arbitration is the “preferred method of settlement in
international disputes.”44

37. The New York Convention, N.Y. ARB. CONVENTION, http://www.newyorkconvention.org/ (last visited Apr.
3, 2019).
38. See Bergsten, supra note 5, at 295 (“In the 1970s, the United States increased trade with the Soviet
Union and other state-trading countries. The American party was usually a private corporation that required an
acceptable, predetermined dispute settlement mechanism. Although disputes over international trade
contracts arose in only a small percent of the contracts, it was important for the parties to know how they
would be settled.”).
39. Id.; see also Mentschikoff, supra note 3, at 856 (From its foundation, the American Arbitration
Association “held itself out as an expert in matters that went to the enforceability of an award and set up its
rules and regulations with the primary aim of rendering awards that would not be set aside by the courts.”).
40. Carbonneau, supra note 23, at 264.
41. See About the American Arbitration Association (AAA) and the International Centre for Dispute
Resolution (ICDR), AM. ARB. ASS’N, https://www.adr.org/about (last visited Apr. 6, 2019) (“The AAA’s and ICDR’s
administrative services include assisting in the appointment of mediators and arbitrators, setting hearings, and
providing users with information on dispute resolution options, including settlement through mediation.”).
42. Stromberg, supra note 29, at 1354–55 (“while the AAA recently eclipsed the ICC with respect to the
amount of international arbitration filings, most of its cases involve an American party.”) (citing Elena V. Helmer,
International Commercial Arbitration: Americanized, “Civilized, “ or Harmonized?, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL.
41–42 (“According to the leading authority in international arbitration, AAA’s number of truly international
cases (cases where both parties are non-U.S.) is ‘modest’ and cannot compete with the ICC numbers.”)).
43. See AM. ARB. ASS’N, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT AND FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 20 (2017) (“There were 1,026 cases
filed with the ICDR in 2017, with total claims of $6.33 billion and counterclaims of $648 million”).
44. See Bergsten, supra note 5, at 300 n.35 (citing Christopher R. Drazohol, Commercial Norms, Commercial
Codes, and International Commercial Arbitration, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 79 (2000) (“International commercial
arbitration is the accepted way of resolving international business disputes… [o]ne estimate is that ninety
percent of all international contracts contain arbitration clauses.”)).

Journal of Business & Technology Law

287

House Rules
D. Singapore International Arbitration Centre
While the first three arbitration houses represent longstanding forums where
international commercial arbitration has thrived, new players have emerged on the
scene.45 In 1991, Singapore entered the international commercial arbitration space
by establishing the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (“SIAC”). 46
Commercial parties attribute SIAC’s popularity for international arbitration in part
to “an efficient and impartial judiciary respectful of the principles of arbitration.” 47
The ICC endorsed this view by noting in 2016 that Singapore represented the most
popular seat in Asia for ICC arbitration.48 By 2018, Singapore had become the third
most popular international commercial arbitration seat in the world.49 Currently,
“eighty percent of SIAC’s caseload is international in nature, while forty-two percent
of the new cases filed in 2016 did not involve Singaporean parties.” 50
II.

CHOOSING THE APPLICABLE L AW – A GLANCE AT THE CHOICE OF L AW
O FFERINGS IN THE FOUR ARBITRAL INSTITUTIONS

The popularity of the four aforementioned arbitration houses stems as much from
their commitment to enforcing arbitral awards as their flexibility in allowing parties
in international commercial arbitration to choose the law applicable to their
arrangement. This section examines the extent to which each forum offers parties
alternatives in the arbitration process.
A. The ICC
The ICC’s Arbitration Rules, last updated on March 1, 2017, “regulate the
management of cases” submitted to the ICC’s International Court of Arbitration. 51
For the ICC, parties should refer to four specific articles under the Arbitral
Proceedings heading, namely: Article 18 – Place of the Arbitration (Article 18(1)
states that “[t]he place of the arbitration shall be fixed by the Court, unless agreed
upon by the parties.” Article 18(2) states that “[t]he arbitral tribunal may, after
consultation with the parties, conduct hearings and meetings at any location it
45. See
generally
CHINA
INT’L
ECON.
TRADE
ARB.
COMM’N
H.K.
ARB.
CTR.,
http://www.cietachk.org/portal/showIndexPage.do?pagePath=%5Cen_US%5Cindex&userLocale=en_US (last
visited Feb. 22, 2020); H.K. INT’L. ARB. CTR., https://www.hkiac.org/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2020); CHARTERED INST.
OF ARB., https://www.ciarb.org/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2020).
46. See Why SIAC, SING. INT’L ARB. CTR., http://www.siac.org.sg/2014-11-03-13-33-43/why-siac.
47. See THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION REVIEW 419 (James H. Carter ed., 9th ed. 2018).
48. See Christopher K. Tahbaz & Justin R. Rassi, The Development of Arbitral Institutions in Asia, 13 U. PA.
ASIAN L. REV. 102, 104 (2018) (citing 2016 ICC Dispute Resolution Statistics, 2017 ICC DISP. RES. BULL. at 111).
49. THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION REVIEW, supra note 47, at 419 (citing WHITE & CASE LLP ET AL., 2018
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION SURVEY: THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2018).
50. See Why SIAC, supra note 46.
51. International Chamber of Commerce [ICC], Arbitration Rules (Mar. 1, 2017).
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considers appropriate, unless otherwise agreed by the parties.”),52 Article 19 –
Rules Governing the Proceeding (“The proceedings before the arbitral tribunal shall
be governed by the Rules and, where the Rules are silent, by any rules which the
parties or, failing them, the arbitral tribunal may settle on, whether or not reference
is thereby made to the rules of procedure of a national law to be applied to the
arbitration.”),53 Article 20 – Language of the Arbitration (“In the absence of an
agreement by the parties, the arbitral tribunal shall determine the language or
languages of the arbitration, due regard being given to all relevant circumstances,
including the language of the contract.”),54 and Article 21 – Applicable Rules of Law
(Article 21(1) states that “[t]he parties shall be free to agree upon the rules of law
to be applied by the arbitral tribunal to the merits of the dispute. In the absence of
any such agreement, the arbitral tribunal shall apply the rules of law which it
determines to be appropriate.”; Article 21(3) states “[t]he arbitral tribunal shall
assume the powers of an amiable compositeur or decide ex aequo et bono only if
the parties have agreed to give it such powers.”).55
The ICC states that these rules “ensure transparency, efficiency and fairness in
the dispute resolution process while allowing parties to exercise their choice over
many aspects of the procedure.”56 Fundamentally, the ICC designed the rules so
that they “balance party autonomy with professional supervision of proceedings.” 57
B.

The LCIA

While the London Court of International Arbitration has touted the autonomy it
provides to commercial parties, the rules governing the LCIA do not offer as much
choice for parties as suggested. The LCIA Arbitration Rules are current as of October
1, 2014.58 In that most recent update, the mention of party choice appears in two
articles of the LCIA Arbitration Rules: Article 16 – Seat(s) of Arbitration and Place(s)
of Hearing (Article 16.2 states that “[t]he parties may agree in writing the seat (or
legal place) of their arbitration at any time before the formation of the Arbitral
Tribunal and, after such formation, with the prior written consent of the Arbitral
Tribunal.”; Article 16.2 further states “ [i]n default of any such agreement, the seat
of the arbitration shall be London (England), unless and until the Arbitral Tribunal
orders, in view of the circumstances and after having given the parties a reasonable
opportunity to make written comments to the Arbitral Tribunal, that another

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

See id. at art. 18(1)–18(2).
See id. at art. 19.
See id. at art. 20.
See id. at art. 21(1).
International Chamber of Commerce [ICC], Arbitration Rules - Mediation Rules, 2 (2017).
Graving, supra note 25, at 332.
See London Court of International Arbitration [LCIA], LCIA Arbitration Rules (Oct. 1, 2014).
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arbitral seat is more appropriate.”),59 and Article 22 – Additional Powers of the
Arbitral Tribunal (“The Arbitral Tribunal shall decide the parties’ dispute in
accordance with the law(s) or rules of law chosen by the parties as applicable to the
merits of their dispute. If and to the extent that the Arbitral Tribunal decides that
the parties have made no such choice, the Arbitral Tribunal shall apply the law(s) or
rules of law which it considers appropriate.”).60 Moreover, Article 16.1 and 16.2
raised concerns regarding party choice.
While the 1998 Rules instructed the LCIA Court to make a final determination on
the location of the arbitral seat absent the parties’ choice (which often defaulted to
London), the 2014 Rules bequeathed that power to the arbitral tribunal instead. 61
Specifically, while the 2014 update indicates that parties retain some measure of
choice to select the seat “even after the arbitral tribunal has been constituted,” the
notion that party autonomy exists in this regard is upended by the tribunal’s ability
“to fix a different seat than the parties have agreed, to the extent such agreement
takes place after constitution of the tribunal.”62
C.

The AAA

As referenced in Part I, the major bulk of the AAA’s international commercial
arbitration occurs under the International Court of Dispute Resolution (“ICDR”).
Two articles discuss the ramifications for parties when they do not come to an
agreement or make their choice explicit: Article 17 – Place of Arbitration (“If the
parties do not agree on the place of arbitration by a date established by the
Administrator, the Administrator may initially determine the place of arbitration,
subject to the power of the arbitral tribunal to determine finally the place of
arbitration within 45 days after its constitution.”),63 and Article 18 – Language of
Arbitration (“If the parties have not agreed otherwise, the language(s) of the
arbitration shall be the language(s) of the documents containing the arbitration
agreement, subject to the power of the arbitral tribunal to determine
otherwise.”).64 Additionally, Article 31 – Applicable Laws and Remedies (“The
arbitral tribunal shall apply the substantive law(s) or rules of law agreed by the
parties as applicable to the dispute. Failing such an agreement by the parties, the
tribunal shall apply such law(s) or rules of law as it determines to be

59.

See id. at art. 16.1–16.2.
See id. at art. 22.3.
61. See Ferdinando Emanuele & Milo Molfa, The Application of the 2014 LCIA Rules to Arbitral Proceedings
Seated in Italy, 8 EUROPEAN, MIDDLE EASTERN, & AFRICAN ARB. REV. 77, 78 (2015).
62. Id. at 78–79.
63. See Int’l Ctr. for Disp. Resol. [ICDR], International Dispute Resolution Procedures, art. 17(1) (June 1,
2014).
64. See id. at art. 18
60.
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appropriate.”),65 enables the tribunal to apply the substantive law on behalf of the
parties if they do not agree on the law beforehand.
D. The SIAC
Similar to its counterparts, the Singapore International Arbitration Center details
what it will do when parties make an explicit choice on both the language and
location of the arbitration. These rules are current as of August 1, 2016. The SIAC
elucidates these specificities in Rule 21 – Seat of the Arbitration (“The parties may
agree on the seat of the arbitration. Failing such an agreement, the seat of the
arbitration shall be determined by the Tribunal, having regard to all the
circumstances of the case.”),66 and Rule 22 – Language of the Arbitration (“Unless
otherwise agreed by the parties, the Tribunal shall determine the language to be
used in the arbitration.”).67
The above rules show that even the best arbitration houses have rules governing
parties when they do not make an explicit choice. However, the existing framework
is inadequate to address the conflict of laws/choice-of-law issues that may arise
when parties fail to make their choice. To improve the current rules and to rekindle
the belief that arbitration places power squarely in the hands of the parties, a
further step must be taken to bridge the gap when parties do not make their choice
clear and choice-of-law issues are implicated. A viable solution involves establishing
express rules governing conflicts of law when parties do not make a definitive
choice.
III.

IMPLEMENTING E XPRESS R ULES GOVERNING CONFLICTS OF LAW A BSENT THE
P ARTIES ’ CHOICE

A. How Scholarship Has Tackled the Conflicts Question in Absence of the
Parties Explicit Choice
The determination by arbitral tribunals of what the applicable law should be when
parties do not make a choice is not a new phenomenon. Under the most recent
version of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(“UNCITRAL”), the UNCITRAL Model law “directs the arbitral tribunal to use a
conflict of laws analysis to determine the applicable law,” which may include a “duty
to apply the conflict of laws rules that it deems applicable or appropriate.” 68
65.

See id. at art. 31.
See Sing. Int’l Arb. Ctr. [SIAC], SIAC Rules, Rule 21.1 (Aug. 1, 2016).
67. See id. Rule 22.1.
68. Silberman & Ferrari, supra note 8, at 4 n.37 (quoting United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law [UNCITRAL], UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, Art. 28(2) (1985) (“Failing any
designation by the parties, the arbitral tribunal shall apply the law determined by the conflict of laws rules
which it considers applicable.”)).
66.
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Contrastingly, the New York Convention does not offer any guidance as to the law
applicable absent parties’ choice.69 The LCIA Rules are in concert with the English
Arbitration Act of 1996, as both adhere to the idea that when the parties do not
make their choice of applicable law clear, the tribunal applies the conflict of laws
rules it deems appropriate.70
The options that arbitral tribunals have in streamlining how they want to apply
the conflicts of laws rules is noted by the variety of choices arbitral tribunals can
make. One scholar has suggested that arbitrators should, absent an arbitration
clause, apply the conflict of laws system of the courts of the country that would
retain jurisdiction over the matter.71 Another approach involves looking to the rules
of the arbitral seat regarding conflicts of laws. 72 Section 6 of the International
Commercial Arbitration Act (“ICAA”) and Article 28(2) of the Model Law bolster the
former point by stating “[i]f the parties have agreed to arbitrate their dispute, but
did not, in a commercial agreement or at the time that the dispute arose, agree on
the law to apply to the agreement and the dispute, then that law is determined by
the arbitral tribunal.”73 A suggestion also exists for utilizing the conflicts of laws
system of the nation where the arbitral award will be enforced. 74 A completely
different proposal involves applying the conflict of laws system of the country most
closely connected with the dispute.75
The most recent scholarship contends that “it is fair to say to parties that they
cannot rely too heavily on a particular law being applied when they choose
arbitration and do not make an explicit choice about applicable law.” 76 However, in
that same breath, this scholarship argues that “parties should be able to have some
control with respect to the choice of law process and to ensure that arbitrators do
what the parties want them to do.”77 To overcome this challenge, parties must

69.

Id. at 5.
See PETER BINDER, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION IN UNCITRAL MODEL LAW
JURISDICTIONS 334 (3rd ed. 2010);
see also United Nations Commission on International Trade Law [UNCITRAL], UNCITRAL Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration, Art. 28(2) (1985).
71. See Carlo Croff, The Applicable Law in an International Commercial Arbitration: Is It Still a Conflicts of
Laws Problem?, 16 INT’L LAW. 613, 615 (1982).
72. See F.A. Mann, Lex Facit Arbitrum, 2 ARB. INT’L 157, 167 (1967); see also Filip De Ly, The Place of
Arbitration in the Conflict of Laws of International Commercial Arbitration: An Exercise in Arbitration Planning,
12 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 48, 53 (1991) (“Under the conflict of laws perspective, the question arises whether and
to what extent the place of arbitration may, in major arbitration jurisdictions, be considered a relevant
connecting point with respect to international commercial arbitrations.”).
73. See Section 6 of the ICAA; see also UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration, art. 28(2) (1985).
74. Silberman & Ferrari, supra note 8, at 15.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 32.
77. Id.
70.
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make express choice of law clauses matter so that in circumstances where
arbitrators fail to honor the parties’ choice by instead applying commercial law or
other legal principles, the action is considered beyond the scope of the arbitrator’s
authority.78 In effect, the absence of party choice in international commercial
arbitration is better served by emphasizing the importance of making an express
choice.
But what if a better answer existed to ensure that the lack of explicit choice by
the parties did not manifest in confused arbitrators who inconsistently applied
conflicts of law analysis? Perhaps an answer that would seek to bring uniformity to
the growing issue of how best to retain party autonomy in selecting the applicable
law without the arbitral institutions imposing the selection on parties and
undercutting their autonomy. The solution I offer is that arbitration houses should
adopt express rules governing conflicts of law when parties do not make an explicit
choice on the applicable law.
B.

Why Express Rules Governing Conflicts of Law Absent Explicit Choice by
the Parties Strengthens International Commercial Arbitration

The primary reason arbitration houses should implement express rules to govern
conflicts of law absent explicit choice by the parties is stability. The unpredictability
of arbitration results is largely due to the absence of definite statements on choice
of law.79 In this chaos, the rules that arbitration houses adopt to govern conflicts of
laws must be consistent and predictable to ensure uniformity.80 Achieving
consistency is critical because courts assess the decisions of arbitration houses and
subsequently establish a body of caselaw that they can refer to for future
decisions.81 However, given the absence of rules governing conflicts of law when
parties do not make an explicit choice, arbitration houses can render decisions that
clarify the standard for determining the governing law in one instance, and then
subsequently modify the standard in the next instance. Two cases below will
illuminate this problem.

78.

Id. at 32.
See Craig M. Gertz, The Selection of Choice of Law Provisions in International Commercial Arbitration:
A Case for Contractual Depeçage, 12 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 163, 177 (1991) (“Without the benefit of clear, definite
statements of the law, arbitrators essentially apply such choices of law by determining de novo what the rules
require for each separate dispute. The results of arbitration thus become unpredictable, eradicating the
outcome-determinative and the dispute reducing qualities of choice of law.”).
80. See S.I. STRONG, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: A GUIDE FOR U.S. JUDGES 21 (2012).
81. Id. (quoting Interim Award in ICC Case No. 4131, IX Y.B. Com. Arb. 131, 135 (1984)) (“[t]he decisions of
these tribunals progressively create caselaw which should be taken into account, because it draws conclusions
from economic reality and conforms to the needs of international commerce, to which rules specific to
international arbitration, themselves successively elaborated should respond.”).
79.
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1.

Case Law
a.

SulAmérica SA v. Enesa Engenharia SA

In SulAmérica Cia Nacional de Seguros SA v. Enesa Engenharia SA (“SulAmérica”),82
the Court of Appeal of England and Wales examined an arbitration agreement
regarding an insurance policy.83 Under the policy, the insurers refused to cover
damages and consequential losses greater than 1 billion Reais resulting from revolts
that temporarily stopped construction of the Jirau hydropower plant. 84 Prior to
arbitration, the parties made an express choice of law that Brazilian law would
“govern the contract.”85 Additionally, the parties agreed to an exclusive jurisdiction
clause to be controlled by the Brazilian courts.86 However, the parties also placed a
multi-layered dispute resolution clause in the policy that established London as the
seat of arbitration and mediation.87
Before the English Court of Appeal decision, the insurers filed suit against the
insured in the 9th Civil Court of the Capital of Sao Paulo.88 The insurers argued that
since they crafted the policy as an adhesion contract, the efficacy of the arbitration
agreement remained suspect.89 Additionally, under Article 4 of the Brazilian
Arbitration Act, the parties did not expressly consent on the arbitration house. 90 A
Brazilian Civil Court judge dismissed the anti-arbitration request made by the
insureds,91 but a week later, another civil court judge upheld the anti-arbitration
request.92 On appeal, the Court of Appeals of the State Sao Paulo upheld the antiarbitration request.93 The Court of Appeals rested its reasoning on the
ineffectiveness of the arbitration agreement under Brazilian law, pursuant to
adhesion contract rules.94

82. Sulamérica Cia Nacional de Seguros S.A. v. Enesa Engenharia S.A. [2012] EWCA (Civ) 638, [2013] WLR
102 (Eng.).
83. Id. at ¶ 1.
84. Id. at ¶ 2.
85. Id. at ¶ 3.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. TJSP AI No. 0304979-49.2011.26.0000, Relator Paulo Alcides, 19.4.2012, DIÁRIO OFCIAL DOS ESTADOS SÃO
PAULO [D.O.E.S.P.], 19.4.2012 (Braz.).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. (“On December 12, 2011, in an ex parte decision, the first instance Brazilian judge dismissed the
interim anti-arbitration request made by the insureds.”).
92. Id. (“On December 19, 2011, a second decision by the Brazilian judge reviewed the insureds’ request
and granted an anti-arbitration injunction against the insurers.”).
93. TJSP AI No. 0304979-49.2011.26.0000, Relator Paulo Alcides, 19.4.2012, DIÁRIO OFCIAL DOS ESTADOS SÃO
PAULO [D.O.E.S.P.], 19.4.2012 (Braz.).
94. Id.
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However, in England, the Court of Appeal came to a different result. The Court
of Appeal fashioned a three-part test to determine the relevant law: (1) the express
choice of the parties, (2) the implied choice of the parties in the absence of an
express choice, and (3) where the parties had not made any choice, the proper law
would be the law which the arbitration agreement has its closest or most real
connection with.95 Since the parties did not adopt an express choice of law provision
to govern the arbitration agreement, the Court of Appeal examined the implied
choice of the parties and the closest/most real connection prong, inquiries which
the Court admitted “will often merge into one another.” 96 The Court of Appeal
started their analysis at this point because the parties likely intended for the
entirety of this relationship to be governed by the same system of laws, unless
indications to the contrary appeared. 97
While the Court of Appeal noted that the parties chose Brazilian law to govern
the policy, that the exclusive jurisdiction clause would be controlled by Brazilian
law, and that the contract itself had a close commercial connection to Brazil, the
Court found the parties’ implied choice to be English law and that English law had
the closest connection for the arbitration agreement. 98 The enforceability of the
arbitration agreement under Brazilian law depended on Ensena’s consent, which
would “undermine the agreement.” 99 Moreover, the Court of Appeal stated that
the substantive law governing the insurance policy did not bear a relationship to
that of dispute resolution, while the exclusive jurisdiction clause maintained a
closer connection to the arbitration agreement.100 By choosing London as their seat
of arbitration, the Court said that the parties accepted that “the law of the country
relating to the conduct and supervision of arbitrations will apply to the
proceedings.”101
The Court of Appeal held that “it is probably fair to start from the assumption
that, in the absence of any indication to the contrary, the parties intended the
whole of their relationship to be governed by the same system of law.” 102
95. Joanne Greenaway, SulAmerica v. Enesa Engenharia: Herbert Smith comment, THOMPSON REUTERS: U.K.
PRAC. L. (May 31, 2012).
96. Id.
97. Sulamérica Cia Nacional De Seguros S.A. v. Enesa Engenharisa S.A. [2012] EWCA (Civ) 638, [11], [2013]
1 WLR 102 (Eng.).
98. Greenaway, supra note 95, at 1.
99. Id.
100. Id. (“Following the approach taken in ACE ltd v CMS Energy Corporation [2009] 1 LRIR 414, the court
did not allow the exclusive jurisdiction clause to encroach on the validity of the parties’ choice to arbitrate
although it left little in practice to court jurisdiction (which was limited to declaring a dispute arbitrable,
compelling arbitration, declaring the validity of the award, or deciding on the merits if the parties dispense with
arbitration).”).
101. Sulamérica Cia Nacional De Seguros S.A. v. Enesa Engenharisa S.A. [2012] EWCA (Civ) 638, [29], [2013]
1 WLR 102 (Eng.).
102. Id. at ¶ 11.
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Furthermore, the Court of Appeal specified that while “it is common for parties to
make an express choice of law to govern their contract, but unusual for them to
make an express choice of the law to govern any arbitration agreement contained
within it,” if the parties have not done so, “the natural inference is that they
intended the proper law chosen to govern the substantive contract also to govern
the agreement to arbitrate.”103
The three part-inquiry implemented by the Court of Appeal in SulAmérica
became the leading authority on determining the law governing an arbitration
agreement. Before SulAmérica, English cases had been split in determining whether
arbitration agreements should be governed by the substantive law of the contract
or by the seat chosen by the parties.104 After the case, parties gained clarity on
which law English courts would apply to arbitration agreement when the choice of
law is not explicit.105 Although courts in other countries evaluating arbitration
agreements absent the parties’ express choice of law looked to SulAmérica for
guidance, application of the three-part test could still yield unpredictable results. 106
Therefore, parties involved in international arbitration are better served when they
expressly include a governing law clause in the arbitration agreement. 107

103.

Id.
See Abuja International Hotels Ltd. v. Meridien SAS [2012] EWHC (Comm) 87, [20, 21], [2012] 1 Lloyd’s
Rep 461 (Hamblen J) (Eng.) (finding that English law applied to the arbitration of a management agreement
governed by Nigeran law because under the closest connection test, the law under which the arbitration had
its closest connection was England, given that the parties agreed that England was the arbitral seat); see also C
v. D [2007] EWCA (Civ) 1282, [13], (Eng.) (administering the closest connection test [meaning, closest
connection to the arbitral seat] to a London arbitration clause in a contract that the parties expressly instructed
New York law to govern).
105. See Arsanovia Ltd. v. Cruz City 1 Mauritius Holdings [2012] EWHC (Comm) 3702 [23], [2013] 1 Lloyd’s
Rep. 235 (Smith J) (Eng.) (finding that the terms of the arbitration agreement, which excluded parts of the Indian
Arbitration and Conciliation Act of 1996, demonstrated a mutual intention of the parties to choose the law of
India as the law of the arbitration agreement); see also Habas Sinai ve Tibbi Gazler Istihsal Endustrisi as v. VSC
Steel Company Ltd. [2013] EWHC (Comm) 4071 [101] (Eng.) (explaining that SulAmerica advised that deciding
on an arbitral seat carries significant weight, particularly absent a clear expression of substantive law in the
main contract; however, if substantive law is expressed in the main contract, it is a strong signal regarding
parties’ intention as to the correct law governing the arbitration agreement, perhaps even to the point that
agreed-upon choices about the proper arbitral seat are insufficient to supersede an express choice of
substantive governing law).
106. See Harry Ormsby, Governing Law of the Arbitration Agreement: Importance of SulAmérica Case
Reaffirmed Where Choice of Seat was Agreed Without Actual Authority, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (Jan. 29, 2014),
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2014/01/29/governing-law-of-the-arbitration-agreementimportance-of-sulamerica-case-reaffirmed-where-choice-of-seat-was-agreed-without-actual-authority/ (“It
will depend on whether there is an express choice of law of the matrix contract; whether there is a choice of
seat in the arbitration agreement (and whether this is different to the express choice of law of the matrix
contract), and whether there are any other “sufficient factors” which may displace an attempt to imply a choice
of law on the basis of the chosen seat and lead to application of the third stage (the “closest connection” test).”).
107. Id.
104.
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b.

Firstlink Investment Corp. Ltd v. GT Payment Pte Ltd. and others

In Firstlink Investment Corp. Ltd v. GT Payment Pte Ltd. and others,108 the question
before the Singapore High Court centered on how to determine which law governs
an international arbitration agreement as impliedly chosen by the parties in the
absence of express choice.109 The contention between the three defendants and
the plaintiff revolved around a perceived violation of an online user agreement. 110
The plaintiff argued that the money deposited to an online account constituted a
loan to the defendants.111 When plaintiff sued, one defendant applied for a stay and
referenced the arbitration agreement the parties signed, stating that claims were
to be adjudicated by the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of
Commerce (“SCC”).112 The plaintiff asserted that the arbitration agreement was
unenforceable as “it does not make sense” for an agreement to be governed by the
“laws” of an international arbitral institute such as the SCC.” 113 The defendant
countered that the parties chose the substantive law to “govern the main contract
and not the arbitration agreement.” 114
The Singapore High Court referenced SulAmérica and implemented the threepart test to determine the applicable law absent the parties’ explicit choice.115 The
Court noted that each part of the test must be examined separately to ensure that
any choice made by the parties is respected. 116 The Court also stated that the
methodology employed in SulAmérica mirrored the test used by the Singapore
Court of Appeal to determine the substantive law governing commercial
contracts.117

108.

FirstLink Investments Corp. Ltd. v GT Payment Pte Ltd. and others [2014] SGHCR 12.
Id. at ¶ 1.
110. Id. at ¶ 3.
111. Id.
112. Id. at ¶ 10.
113. FirstLink Invs. Corp. v. GT Payment Pte., [2014] SGHCR 12 ¶ 10 (Sing.).
114. Id.
115. Id. at ¶ 11.
116. Id. See also Greenaway, supra note 95, at 2 (“This tracks the development of the principle of
separability, whereby the arbitration agreement is legally distinct from the contract of which it forms a part.”);
U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, UNCITRAL Model Law of Int’l Arbitration, U.N. Doc. A/40/17 (July 7, 2006).
117. FirstLink Invs. Corp. v. GT Payment Pte., [2014] SGHCR 12 ¶ 16 (Sing.) (citing Pacific Recreation Pte. Ltd.
V. S.Y. Technology, Inc., [2008] 2 SLR(R) 491 ¶ 36 (“There are three stages in determining the governing law of
a contract. The first stage is to examine the contract itself to determine whether it states expressly what the
governing law should be. In the absence of an express provision one moves to the second stage which is to see
whether the intention of the parties as to the governing law can be inferred from the circumstances. If this
cannot be done, the third stage is to determine with which system of law the contract has its most close and
real connection.”)) (citing JIO Minerals FZC v. Mineral Enterprises Ltd., [2011] 1 SLR 391 ¶ 79 (“It is well
established that a three-stage approach is applied to determine the governing law of a contract … At the first
stage, the court considers if the contract expressly states its governing law (“the Express Law”). If the contract
is silent, the court proceeds to the second stage and considers whether it can infer the governing law from the
109.
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Ultimately though, the Singapore High Court noted that part two of the
SulAmérica test needs refining because the English Court of Appeal “created a
rebuttable presumption that the express substantive law of the contract would be
taken as the parties’ implied choice of the proper law governing the arbitration
agreement.”118 To avoid that presumption, the Singapore High Court instead stated
that “it cannot always be assumed that commercial parties want the same system
of law to govern their relationship of performing the substantive obligations under
the contract, and the quite separate (and often unhappy) relationship of resolving
disputes when problems arise.”119 Thus, the natural inference that parties want the
same system of laws to govern two separate relationships cannot exist.120
Instead of adopting the natural inference that the English Court of Appeal posits
in SulAmérica, the Singapore High Court stressed that when parties seek to resolve
their disagreements through dispute resolution, the parties should opt for
neutrality principles.121 The High Court further observed that the most important of
neutrality principles is allowing the law of the arbitral seat to recognize and enforce
the arbitration agreement.122 By selecting a neutral seat, the parties would have
“implicitly selected the lex arbitri of the seat to govern matters including the
supervisory court’s powers to determine a jurisdictional dispute in relation to the
validity of an arbitration agreement.”123 Furthermore, because the parties’ choice
of a neutral seat incorporates a selection of the arbitral seat to preside over
procedural aspects of the arbitration (i.e. the determination of a jurisdictional
dispute by a supervisory court with respect to the enforceability of an arbitration
agreement), it is logical that parties intended the same system of law to govern the
validity of the arbitration agreement in order to ensure consistency between the
law and procedure of determining the legitimacy of the arbitration agreement. 124
In Firstlink, the Singapore High Court makes a compelling case for the arbitral
seat to govern the validity of the arbitration agreement in the absence of express
choice by the parties.125 The Singapore High Court’s decision puts a premium on

intentions of the parties (“the Implied Law”). If the court is unable to infer the parties’ intentions, it moves to
the third stage and determines the law which has the closest and most real connection with the contract (“the
Objective Law”).”).
118. Id.
119. Id. at ¶ 13.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See Singapore High Court Finds that Parties are Presumed to have Chosen the Law of the Seat as the
Proper
Law
of
the
Arbitration
Agreement,
CLIFFORD CHANCE at
2
(June
2014),
https://www.cliffordchance.com/content/dam/cliffordchance/briefings/2014/06/singapore-high-court-findsthat-parties-are-presumed-to-have-chosen-the-law-of-the-seat-as-the-proper-law-of-the-arbitra.pdf.
123. FirstLink Invs. Corp. v. GT Payment Pte., [2014] SGHCR 12 ¶ 15 (Sing.).
124. Id.
125. See supra note 122, at 3.
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ensuring neutrality and integrity for the arbitration process.126 By applying the law
of the arbitral seat instead of the substantive law of the underlying contract, the
Singapore High Court sends a clear message that the law of the seat is more aligned
with the commercial intention of the parties.127
Both SulAmérica and Firstlink lay out a framework for what rules govern an
arbitration agreement when parties do not make their choice of law explicit.
However, while the rule set forth in SulAmérica can be referred to as a leading
authority, the rule established in Firstlink reveals that even the leading authority
can be altered within a short period of time based on the nature of the case. 128
Given that arbitration houses adopt different rules to govern the agreement when
the parties do not make an explicit choice of law, houses should adopt a system
where the rules governing conflicts does not change on a case-by-case basis. Such
a move would establish a consistent framework that parties can refer to when
crafting their arbitration agreements. Moreover, it would facilitate more business
for an arbitration house that implements this system, increasing jurisdictional
competition.
2.

Jurisdictional Competition: Establishing House Rules Absent Party
Choice to Increase Caseload

International arbitration houses specialize in attracting clients to conduct business
in their house instead of another’s.129 Increased competition between arbitration
houses can stem from a change as simple, but important, as introducing specialized
commercial courts that “bring international dispute resolution ‘business’ back to
the domestic courts.”130 The race to secure arbitration cases exploded over the
course of the last few decades.131 The reason for this boom is that jurisdictions
realized that having laws that provide parties with greater autonomy to arbitrate

126.

Id.
Id.
128. Greenaway, supra note 95, at 2 (“[A]lthough we now have clearer guidance as to the law which English
courts will apply to the arbitration agreement where it is not stipulated, there is still room for uncertainty and
much will depend on the circumstances of the case.”). See also FirstLink Invs. Corp. v. GT Payment Pte., [2014]
SGHCR 12 ¶ 16 (Sing.) (“Nevertheless, I must caution that the determination of the implied proper law
ultimately remains a question of construction; each case will have to turn on its own facts.”).
129. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Diversity and Uniformity in International Arbitration Law, 31 EMORY INT’L
L. REV. 393, 411 (2017) (“Competition among jurisdictions for arbitration business provides the incentive for this
sort of [legal] innovation in international arbitration law.”).
130. See Alison Chamberlain, Destination Arbitration: Competition in the Market for Justice, THOMPSON
REUTERS: PRAC. L. ARB. BLOG (Mar. 21, 2019), http://arbitrationblog.practicallaw.com/destination-arbitrationcompetition-in-the-market-for-justice/.
131. See ERIN A. O’HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET 92 (2009) (“The caseload of the American
Arbitration Association, which is now chosen in more than 10 percent of international contracts utilizing
arbitration, more than tripled from 1993 to 2003.”).
127.
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their private agreements would indubitably receive more commerce. 132 Moreover,
jurisdictions began to understand that the entity that fashioned a rule governing a
financial transaction, be it a state, a foreign nation, or a private organization,
mattered less as long as private, consenting parties had greater autonomy “to make
welfare-enhancing transactions.”133
In the same way that private parties being able to “opt out of mandatory
domestic laws through offshore incorporation mirrors ‘legal regime shopping,’” 134
parties should have the ability to regime shop for arbitration houses that clearly
elucidate rules governing an arbitration agreement when the parties do not make
their choice of law explicit.135 Take the example of the three-part inquiry established
by the Court of Appeal in SulAmérica. If parties do not make an explicit choice about
the law to govern their London arbitration clause, SulAmérica states that the test
goes to implied choice/closest connection. However, SulAmérica also says that
individual cases must be evaluated on a case by case basis. So, the question
remains, is the implied choice/closest connection test reserved only for cases where
the facts are similar to SulAmérica? This unpredictability is reason enough for
parties to ask that arbitration houses adopt express rules governing choice of law
when the parties do not make a choice.
International commercial arbitration is trending towards homogeneity as
competition increases between longtime arbitration strongholds and regional
arbitral seats.136 The gap between these houses is shrinking when it comes to cost,
delay, sophistication, reliability, consistency, and efficacy. 137 If homogeneity is
inevitable, then adopting express rules on conflicts of laws absent party choice will
be one way to continue to bolster jurisdictional competition.

132. Id. at 86–87 (“Since the mid-1980s, arbitration has emerged as an important dispute resolution tool
for international commerce. . . . Contracting parties have significant freedom to choose between one or more
court systems and arbitration. If the parties agree to resolve their disputes with binding arbitration, nations
with significant international trade and investment activity commonly will enforce the arbitration clause and
the subsequent arbitration award.”).
133. See William J. Moon, Regulating Offshore Finance, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1, 42 (2019).
134. Id. at 43.
135. See Erin A. O’Hara & Peter B. Rutledge, Arbitration, The Law Market, and The Law of Lawyering, 38
INT’L. REV. L. & ECON. 87, 90 (2014) (If, as a practical matter, several jurisdictions, both within the United States
and abroad, have deliberately liberalized their home legal regimes, including their lawyer licensing rules, in
order to market themselves as more “arbitration friendly,” then surely the same concept could apply to
arbitration houses liberalizing their rules to adopt a new system that makes explicit the rules governing
arbitration agreements absent express choice by the parties.).
136. See Kimberly Chen Nobles, Emerging Issues and Trends in International Arbitration, 43 CAL. W. INT’L L.J.
77, 107 (2012).
137. Id. at 108.
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3.

The House Default Rule: Safeguarding Privately Created Rights by
Solidifying Arbitral Rules Governing Conflicts of Law Absent Party
Choice

While increasing competition between arbitral tribunals undoubtedly challenges
houses to adopt express rules governing conflicts of laws absent party choice,
parties may be concerned if the house is best suited to determine default rules 138
when the parties either intentionally or unintentionally fail to make it clear in their
agreement. Since “arbitration is a creature of contract,” 139 the “disputes go to
arbitration only with the consent of all parties to the dispute.” 140 Moreover, in
international commercial arbitration, a fundamental principle regarding conflicts of
law that has emerged is the arbitrators duty to respect the rights of the parties to
identify the applicable law governing their agreement. 141 Therefore, critics of the
proposal set forth here may say that unless significant public policy considerations
exist,142 arbitration houses should not interfere on the parties’ right to choose
which law governs their agreement, even if that choice includes not making a call
on a potential conflicts of law issue.
Although party autonomy reigns supreme in arbitration, the reason parties
choose a specific arbitral house is that they believe that tribunal can best preside
over their agreement.143 In making that decision, parties are aware of the rules that
each arbitration house has implemented. Because default rules can be opted out of
by the parties through their contract, parties might resist allowing arbitrators to
impose a house default rule onto them. However, if arbitration houses adopt
express rules to govern conflicts of law absent party choice, the house is simply

138. See Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, 83
MINN. L. REV. 703, 706 (1999) (“Default rules are those government-created rights and duties that are
privatizable, rules that govern unless the parties contract out of them.”).
139. See generally AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011) (“arbitration is a matter of
contract”); Sgouros v. Transunion Corp., 817 F.3d 1029, 1033 (7th Cir. 2016) (“As the Supreme Court repeatedly
has emphasized, arbitration is a creature of contract.”); First Liberty Inv. Group v. Nicholsberg, 145 F.3d 647,
649 (3rd Cir. 1998) (“Arbitration is a creature of contract.”).
140. Ware, supra note 138, at 708–09.
141. See Cindy G. Buys, The Arbitrators’ Duty to Respect the Parties’ Choice of Law in Commercial Arbitration,
79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 59, 59 (2005) (“‘The right of the parties to themselves identify the law to apply and the
obligation on arbitrators to respect that choice is the one overwhelming and truly international conflict of laws
rule which [sic] has developed in international commercial arbitration.’” (quoting JULIAN D.M. LEW, APPLICABLE
LAW IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 582 (1978))).
142. Id. at 70 (“Arbitrators do, however, have a duty to render an award that is enforceable. If the arbitrators
render an award that is contrary to the public policy of the forum or of the place of enforcement, the award
may be unenforceable, leaving the prevailing party without an adequate remedy.”).
143. See Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and
the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2856 (2015) (“Negotiating parties could design their own idiosyncratic
procedures, select their decision makers, and stipulate remedies to suit their preferences. Arbitrators in turn
derived their power from and owed their loyalties to the parties’ intent, rather than governing law.”).
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alerting parties that by choosing a particular tribunal, parties can still contract
around all the other default rules of the contract except the house default rule that
governs conflicts of law when party choice is not made clear.
While the new house default rule may be seen as too burdensome and an
overplay by arbitration houses against the strong history of allowing parties to
decide what they want to contract around, the truth is that “in theory, the law
governing arbitration should supply the default provisions necessary to fill any
gaps.”144 In adopting this express rule, arbitration houses would effectively
communicate to parties that if they do not make their choice of law clear to govern
conflicts, the house has established a rule to remedy the issue. Similar to how
“courts may need to require parties to announce at the outset of arbitration
whether they are asserting any claims arising under mandatory law,”145 so that it
would “alert other parties to the risk of a motion to vacate for failure to apply the
law and to the need for a record of the arbitration proceedings,” 146 the arbitration
house would simply alert parties to the fact that by choosing this seat, an embedded
house rule controls in the absence of party choice with respect to conflicts of law.
In this sense, the arbitration house is forewarning parties that the tribunal already
has a rule on the books to govern conflicts of law irrespective of whether the parties
opted for or against determining how best to govern a conflicts issue.
There may be fear that imposition of a rule absent party choice judicializes 147 the
arbitral forum, allowing the house to serve as the final legal body that reviews the
agreement to determine if the parties made an express choice of law determination
on conflicts. I disagree. The addition of the default house rule does not trump
freedom of contract and does not interfere on party choice. 148 Here, however, the
new rule is a default rule, and it is not designed to eliminate the default rules
already agreed to by the parties to govern their contract. Instead, this rule permits
freedom of contract to continue and only arises when parties have not made choice
of law clear to govern conflicts of law for the arbitration. Additionally, the default
rules that the parties set forth to govern their contract are not being subjected to

144. See Jack Graves, Arbitration as Contract: The Need for a Fully Developed and Comprehensive Set of
Statutory Default Legal Rules, 2 WM. & MARY BUS L. REV. 225, 249 (2011).
145. Ware, supra note 138, at 740.
146. Id.
147. See Wesley A. Sturges, Arbitration – What Is It?, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031, 1045 (1960) (“Sometimes
arbitration is cited as being a ‘quasi-judicial tribunal’ and arbitrators as being ‘judges’ of the parties’ choosing,
‘judicial officers’ or officers exercising ‘judicial functions.’”).
148. Ware, supra note 138, at 739 (“The essence of a mandatory rule is that it trumps freedom of
contract.”). Here, however, the new rule is a default rule, and it is not designed to eliminate the default rules
already agreed to by the parties to govern their contract. Instead, this rule permits freedom of contract to
continue and only arises when parties have not made choice of law clear to govern conflicts of law for the
arbitration.
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arbitral review.149 In this instance, judicial review and arbitral review are
interchangeable, in that the arbitration house is not functioning as a courthouse.
Lastly, the arbitral tribunal is not applying mandatory public law to override the
parties’ contract because they did not choose how to govern conflicts of law
issues.150 Instead, the default house rule exists only to explain how the arbitration
house proceeds if this situation arises. Whether the arbitration house opts for the
seat of arbitration151 to be the controlling standard or looks to see if the parties
added an exclusive jurisdiction clause,152 a house default rule will not inhibit the
parties’ freedom to contract in any way while simultaneously providing a clarifying
standard that arbitration houses will follow.
4.

Strengthening Dispute Resolution: The House Default Rule Fills the Gap

As with any newly proposed rule, an overarching consideration must be whether
the rule improves upon the current situation when parties do not make an express
choice governing conflicts of law. History informs us that if the parties did not intend
to make an express choice governing conflicts of law, then either one or both parties
may have had a reason not to.153 This type of default is referred to as a penalty
default.154 However, to repel this maneuver, two scholars suggested that “courts
should choose defaults that are different from what the parties would have
wanted.”155
If courts can be called upon to counter the will of a more knowledgeable party
seeking to hide information from the other, then this check can be extended to
arbitration houses. Unlike courts, which would evaluate the merits of hiding the

149. Id. (“Unless the agreement calls for it, arbitration claims arising under default rules should not be
subject to judicial review for errors of law.”).
150. See generally Mohammad Reza Baniassadi, Do Mandatory Rules of Public Law Limit Choice of Law in
International Commercial Arbitration, 10 INT’L TAX & BUS. LAW. 59, 59 (1992) (explaining that “an arbitrator who
decides to apply the mandatory rules of public law faces three problems: 1) party perception that mandatory
rules of public law are an unnecessary interference with formation and performance of international contracts;
2) conflicts between the underlying public policy and the contracting parties’ will; and 3) enforceability of the
arbitration award.”).
151. See ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 3–42
(4th ed. 2004) (discussing how in international commercial arbitration, gaps are filled by reference to the
presiding arbitration law—normally that of the place of arbitration.).
152. See England and Whales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions, supra note 86 and Greenaway, supra
note 100 (referencing the exclusive jurisdiction clause in SulAmérica and how it did not affect the parties’ desire
to arbitrate in a particular seat).
153. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default
Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 100 (1989) (“The knowledgeable party may not wish to reveal her information in
negotiations if the information would give a bargaining advantage to the other side.”).
154. Id. at 91 (“Penalty defaults are designed to give at least one party to the contract an incentive to
contract around the default rule and therefore to choose affirmatively the contract provision they prefer.”).
155. Id. at 103.
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information on legal grounds, arbitration houses, as a-national bodies of law, can
simply craft a default house rule that prevents this issue from occurring in the first
place. In the case of a party that does not want its reasons known for failing to make
an express choice of law determination on conflicts, the arbitration house can make
a policy determination and say that “in some instances, a particular party may need
to acquire certain types of information before contracting, so that forcing disclosure
would have minimal disincentive effects.” 156 In adopting the house default rule,
arbitration houses could “deter[] inefficient gaps at the least social cost,” 157
preserving party autonomy to contract with each other without subjugating both
parties and the house itself to confusion in terms of which rule to apply when
parties do not make a clear choice on laws governing conflicts.
Although the prevailing thought in arbitration is that party autonomy is
sacrosanct, for arbitration houses to avoid unpredictability, filling in the gaps in
rules is critical. Much like “courts need to establish … rules for deciding when a
contract is incomplete,”158 arbitration houses should be determined to plug holes
in their own rules. Doing so will create “‘safeharbors’ [sic] of contractual
language”159 that alert parties, both knowledgeable and lacking, to the simplicity
and directness of arbitrating in a particular seat. This gap filling process will
undoubtedly strengthen arbitration while simultaneously ensuring that the house
respects party choice to contract out of anything besides the house default rule.
CONCLUSION

Arbitration houses do not have rules when parties do not make an express choice
on conflict of laws. The lack of rules adds to the chaotic nature and unpredictability
of arbitral results. By compelling arbitration houses to adopt a house default rule
on conflicts of laws absent party choice, arbitration houses can flesh out a uniform
rule, increase competition amongst the other arbitration houses, protect party
autonomy, and bring stability to the arbitration rules governing conflicts of laws.

156.
157.
158.
159.
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